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2 In Search of the Hollow Crown 

Michael Saward 

The American political philosopher Michael Walzer echoed a widespread 
perception when he wrote recently that 'the state is boring these days, or it 
is ineffective and corrupt ... while civil society is an exciting place'. The 
power of many national states is said to be leaching away from above and 
below. Short-term actions and long-terms trends, so the refrain goes, all 
point to a common process - the hollowing out of the state .. 
How can we make sense of the idea of the 'hollow crown'? The 
volume as a whole identifies trends and counter-trends in five countries. 
This chapter is confined to interrogating the idea of hollowing out itself. 
While a tentative conclusion is reached - namely, that the hollowing out 
thesis is more credible in terms of international rather than national trends 
- it is recognized that the debate on the reshaping of states is still in its 
infancy, and other chapters take a different line. In some respects my 
central point concerns methodology, and specifically the conceptual 
frameworks that are most appropriate to the study of the state today. 
What Is Hollowing Out? 
This question is both unavoidable and unanswerable in the space available. 
I shall pass over ancient and massive controversies surrounding the 
question 'what is the state?', and simply posit the following points to 
anchor my position: the state is a more or less coherent set of institutions 
with unique authority to impose its will upon other institutions, groups and 
individuals within a defined territory. It is an institutionalized legal order 
consisting of the public bureaucracy and its political overseers. This view 
rules out definitions of the state as (a) the government only, (b) an 
instrument of the ruling class, and (c) a normative order (Krasner, 1984; 
Burnham, 1994).1 This is important, since a hollow state would be 
something quite different for each definition. 
Beyond the definition, my background approach to the contemporary 
state is built upon the following points. 
• 	 The primary brute fact about the contemporary state is the sheer 
complexity of its structures and functions and the issues confronting it. 
The modern state is a huge enterprise made up of hundreds if not 
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thousands of separate organizations with multiple and often confused 
lines of communication, cooperation and accountability. It is not an 
entity ultimately united by the need to perform some overriding 
function. 
• 	 Far from being a neutral or impartial referee between competing 
interests, the state is partisan towards certain particular interests within 
society (Parekh 1994). The object and degree of partisanship will vary 
from institution to institution (or policy area to policy area), and may 
include producer, professional or ethnic-religious interests (Lindblom, 
1977; Eckstein, 1960; Habermas, 1974; Parekh, 1994). Unless momen­
tarily or accidentally or in exceptional circumstances, the state repre­
sents no unified high ideal, and can make no consistent or large-scale 
claims to embody or represent 'the common good'.2 
• 	 The state has autonomy, never absolute but always present, from other 
social and economic interests (see Skocpol, 1985; Nordlinger, 1981). 
The state's informational, organizational and other resources (not least 
its ultimate monopoly of the use of legitimate coercion) ensure that its 
various institutions never entirely lack room for manoeuvre with 
respect to the wants of societal interests. 
In sum, this broadly neo~pluralist perspective portrays the contemporary 
state as partisan, characterized by three interrelated dimensions of 
complexity (structural, functional and technical) and never entirely lacking 
in autonomy from societal forces. 3 
What Changes Occur in a Hollowing Out State? 
If the state is hollowing out, what is happening to it? The idea makes most 
sense as a speculation about a loss of capacity at the heart of the state - in 
the core executive.4 In his article 'The Hollowing Out of the State' - an 
'avowedly speculative' effort to make sense of the idea, discussed in more 
detail below - Rhodes writes that 'The phrase "the hollowing out of the 
state" suggests the British state is being eroded or eaten away' (Rhodes 
1994: 138). All such labels are ambiguous, but the bottom line is that 
things 'erode' from the outside and 'hollow' from within, from the centre 
or core. Seen in this light, the hollowing out thesis is a thesis about the core 
executive. We need not debate tensions between the ideas of a 'hollow 
state' versus a 'hollow core', since the hollow state means a state with a 
hollow core. 
What is it that is hollow about a hollow core? Does the core executive 
lack coherence, capacity or both? There is a strong case for saying that a 
loss or lack of capacity is the primary meaning. If the core is hollow but 
has lost no capacity, then the only sensible meaning for the hollowing out 
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idea can be moral (the state is not pursuing its Rawlsian agenda for social 
justice, failing to maximize utility, or some such). Capacity can more 
readily (though not easily) be explored empirically; coherence is a fuzzier 
notion, where explanation shades into normative concerns about 'good 
government' (with the theory of good government involved more often than 
not left implicit). Where coherence is likely to affect future capacity of a 
certain kind, the two shade into each other, admittedly - other chapters in 
this volume are not wrong to take coherence seriously, since the pursuit of 
coherence may represent an effort to counteract a loss of capacity - but 
here I will discuss hollowing out as a claim about what is happening to the 
capacity of the core executive in the five countries. 
Explaining Shifts in Capacity 
Rhodes's (1994) work has helped to clarify the concept and its referents. 
He identifies some key developments in British politics in the Thatcher and 
Major years which have had a variety of 'unintended outcomes'. On the 
internal or domestic front the development of a multiplicity of alternative 
delivery systems, particularly executive agencies (or Next Steps agencies), 
has resulted in the fragmentation and increased complexity of British 
government. The limitation of discretion for public servants through the 
New Public Management has raised the threat of policy 'catastrophe' 
(privatization and new limits on public intervention are also mentioned). 
Rhodes then discusses consequences of these unintended outcomes: 
fragmentation fosters inefficiency through the overlapping of functions and 
obscures lines of accountability. Complexity likewise muddies the waters 
of accountability. Ultimately, this loss of accountability is likely to mean a 
loss of political control at the centre. 
I believe we can add to Rhodes' account of hollowing out in three key 
areas. 
1. 	 We need to consider carefully intended outcomes. In Britain, the 'loss' 
of functions to 'alternative delivery systems' (contracting out, market 
testing, executive agencies, etc.) was often no loss at all; the Thatcher 
and Major governments have positively fostered these developments, 
actively demonstrating core executive capacities in the process. One 
might reply that what was intended was lower public spending, a 
smaller state and a stronger role for the market mechanism within and 
between public institutions. Whether or not these aims were achieved, 
fragmentation, complexity and a loss of political control were 
unintended consequences. But fragmentation, complexity and less 
political control are characteristic of markets. 
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2. 	 Rhodes adopts the nonnative stance of the good public administrator 
without defending it as the best (or at least a good) way to explain 
hollowing out. In a key passage, he quotes the head of the British civil 
service on the danger that fragmentation and so on, will lead to there 
being 'no real working mechanisms for policy coordination'. Future 
governments, particularly ones with an interventionist bent and 
redistributive aims, will need to be able to steer service delivery. 
Fragmentation and complexity will be obstacles to steering. 
True as these consequences may be for the state, highlighting them is 
a consequence of the implicit theory of good government employed. 
Rhodes cites approvingly the notion that the unelected public 
administrator can play a role 'roughly akin to the Platonic guardian, 
standing for integrity and probity against partisan interest and 
corruption'. This approach is more about condemning what has 
happened rather than explaining it. It does not get to the heart of the 
hollowing out conjecture. That is an empirical proposition, which 
needs to be addressed in a more strictly explanatory framework. 
What would be a better framework? I suggest we look first at the 
interests of those who have initiated these changes. In the 'predatory 
theory of rule' , Levi (1981) suggests that we can explain what states do 
by assuming that rulers (for present purposes the core executive) seek 
to maximize their wealth and power. Their success in so doing 
depends on the nature and extent of bargaining resources they hold vis­
a-vis their subjects. Subjects will possess an array of resources ­
economic, political, military - which they can use to constrain the 
ruler and wrest concessions.5 
The predatory theory presents an amoral picture of ruling. That is all 
to the better. If the idea of the hollow state is to have real meaning it 
must focus on the capacity of the core to impose its will on the rest. 
The desirability of its being able to do so is neither here nor there; it is 
an important question, but a separate one that requires a separate, and 
appropriately grounded, analysis. 
3. 	 The 'clearer political control' which Rhodes identifies as one 
consequence of a sharper distinction between politics and 
administration in fact suggests the opposite of hollowing out in tenns 
of diminished central capacity. This fonnulation does suggest that 
(some parts of) the core may well be strengthened by certain recent 
shifts in state power and functions. In addition, when discussing the 
major changes in the British civil serv~ce under Conservative rule, 
Rhodes argues that (a) public bureaucracy has become 'a patchwork 
.qUilt of organisations' (1994: 142), and (b) that 'In effect, the job of the 
individual civil servant is being hollowed out from above and below' 
(1994: 145). A hollowing out of civil service jobs does not make for a 
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hollow core. It, too, might strengthen the position of the core by 
allowing it scope to divide and rule. 
In short, while hollowness may be a function of a lack of democracy, 
accountability and action in ,the 'public interest' , in a more primary sense it 
should be seen as a thesis about core executive capacities in the 
contemporary state. Democracy and accountability do not necessarily serve 
the interests of the core. Because confused lines of accountability may 
foster a concentration of power at the core, we can expect rational core 
actors to seek them. Of course, all this remains speculative. We must turn 
to an examination of key trends in the countries under scrutiny to pursue 
matters further. 
Three Hypotheses 
If a 'hollowing out' state is a state with an increasingly weak core 
executive, three logical hypotheses follow: 
1. 	 the core executive is losing or conceding capacities to societal actors; 
2. 	 the core executive is losing or conceding its capacity to control other 
state actors; and 
3. 	 the core executive is losing or conceding capacities to supra-state 
entities. 
The following sections examine these possibilities. 
Down and Out: The Internal Hollowing Out of the State? 
The notion that the state is hollowing out internally relates to the first two 
of our three hypotheses. It is suggested that either the core of the state is 
losing control over other societal actors and organizations, or over other 
parts of the state machine. This is close to what Crook, Pakulski and 
Waters are getting at when they refer to the transfer of functions 
'downwards' and 'sideways' (the third of their possibilities is 'upwards', 
which I consider in the following section) as part of a broader process of 
'disetatization' (1992: 80). I shall consider three general developments 
which are often (e.g. by Rhodes) linked to the idea that the state is hollow­
ing out internally: privatization, decentralization and 'agencification'. 
Privatization 
By far the biggest and most profound privatization programme has been 
that of the Thatcher and Major governments in Britain.6 Wilks has written 
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that 'With plans to privatise British Rail, British Coal and the Post Office 
after the 1992 election there is almost literally nothing left to sell' (Wilks, 
1993: 235) (though it is worth noting that the sale of the Post Office has 
fallen through, and that of British Rail - the 'Poll Tax on wheels' - is 
mired in controversy). In Britain the full gamut of motivations behind 
industrial privatization has been evident: ideological, economic, financial, 
managerial and party political (Vickers and Wright, 1988). With 16 major 
privatizations completed, including gas, water and electricity (Lawson, 
1993), it is clear that privatization has fundamentally altered basic 
structures and functions of the British state. 
Cataclysmic comments about the effects of privatization on the basic 
roles of the state may have some place in Britain, but privatization has 
played a significantly less prominent role in each of the other countries 
under study. In (West) Germany, despite strident calls by neo-liberals, 
backed in the party arena by the Free Democrats (FDP), there has not been 
an extensive privatization programme. The combination of a persisting 
party and national consensus about the role of the state in production, 
continuing Uinder preference for maintaining public stakes in strategic 
industries, an overriding concern for national competitiveness, and the fact 
that '[a]ll those industries and corporations which are in the long run 
strategically important for the maintenance of key positions in world 
markets are privately owned' (Esser, 1988: 70-1), has rendered privati­
zation in Germany largely 'symbolic'. The West German government 
between 1984 and 1987 did reduce or eliminate its stake in over 50 
companies, notably ones involved in energy, chemicals and transport, but 
the programme overall has fallen well short of that of Britain (and indeed of 
France, the second major privatizer among European democracies). 
Like Germany and unlike Britain, mUlti-party government and a more 
sympathetic view of the role of the state in production have limited the size, 
influence and fervour of the coalition of forces calling for substantial 
privatization in the Netherlands. Kickert (1994: 11) reports that although 
all four Dutch state companies have been more or less privatized -
Postbank, PIT, Fishery Port Authority, Royal Mint7 - attention came to 
focus by the early 1990s on 'the increase of administrative independence 
for-organisation units financed or controlled by government, instead of the 
transfer of government tasks to the market'. As Andeweg and Irwin report, 
slimming down the Dutch public sector means focusing on welfare 
provision rather than industrial privatization. There was not a great deal to 
privatize in the first place, and, as in West Germany, the motivations were 
pragmatic: 'privatisation was advocated for reasons of administrative 
efficiency and budgetary reduction; it was not motivated by an ideological 
crusade for free-market capitalism' (Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 200).8 
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Since 1983, under the Hawke and Keating Labor governments, 
Australia has been involved in a large-scale programme of deregulation 
(notably in banking and aviation), exposing protected industries to 
international competition (the inside political story of which is told in 
Kelly, 1994). In Canada, privatization had a lesser impact, not least 
because there were fewer strategic industries wholly or substantially con­
trolled by the public sector. Canadian refonns have stressed more the need 
to cull various advisory and regulatory boards, councils and committees. 
The extent of state disengagement from direct production has differed 
enonnously in the five countries. Among the many reasons for this, of 
course, is the fact that the shape, extent and motivations for privatization 
depend upon the extent and style of public ownership and control of 
important industries in the first place (see Vickers and Wright, 1988: 11). 
Further, the state-society balance of power in, for example, Gennany and 
the Netherlands, has meant that rational action by core actors (as in the 
predatory theory) has been preservative rather than transfonnative. By 
contrast, the core executive in Britain could more readily free itself from 
constraints to transfonn production fundamentally. It is interesting that 
neither broad approach offers conclusive evidence of a hollowing out of the 
state. In the more 'consensual' democracies (Lijphart, 1984b), the core 
continues to be constrained by more restrictive constitutional structures and 
standard operating procedures. If that represents 'hollowing out', then it 
was done in the past and is not a recent development. In 'majoritarian' 
systems, privatization may appear to be hollowing out the state, but this 
trend can equally be interpreted in tenns of core actors rationally reshaping 
the state to suit some of their primary ends (such as power, autonomy, 
protection from direct responsibility). Where privatization has been 
extensive, the pressures driving it have come from above, in the core 
executive or from advisory groups operating through the core executive. 
In sum, privatization offers no strong evidence in favour of the 
hollowing out hypothesis.9 Indeed, we can see it as core actors flexing their 
political muscles. Perhaps, as Cassese has argued, privatization and 
deregulation 'revitalize the center, but not the state' (quoted in Rockman 
1989). In a similar vein, Majone (1994: 79) comments that '. . . 
privatisation tends to strengthen, rather than weaken, the regulatory 
capacity of the state'.10 In other words, predatory rulers can enhance their 
positions by pursuing such programmes. 
Decentralization 
Are core institutions in the five countries losing functions to other levels of 
government? The evidence for this is scant; if anything, the opposite trend 
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has loomed larger in recent years. In Britain, a unitary state, a massive 
centralization of territorial power has taken place since 1979. More than 50 
pieces of legislation since 1979 have fundamentally altered the role, powers 
and style of local government; as King argues, 'The aim of these reforms is 
to marginalise local government as a political institution by creating 
alternative local agencies to deliver policy and by denuding its 
representative function' (King, 1993: 194). 
In the Netherlands, there has been little if any recent shift in the balance 
of power between the three levels of government. The powers of the much­
criticized middle rung, the provinces, are limited, while the leaders of more 
important local government units are appointed from the centre. The vast 
bulk of revenue for local government comes from the centre. As Andeweg 
and Irwin have written, 'There is no escaping the conclusion that, relative 
to most other West European countries, the Dutch policy-making process is 
highly centralised in territorial terms' (Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 163). 
The three federal systems in the study display markedly different 
distributions of functions and powers between national and state 
governments. Australia is considerably more centralized than either 
Gennany or Canada. Throughout much of the Commonwealth's history, 
the perceived need for central promotion of economic development 
encouraged an accretion of powers and functions at the federal level. A 
combination of factors, chiefly sympathetic judicial interpretation of federal 
powers under the Constitution, unchallenged legislation and the merely 
conventional status of the state Premiers' Conference, have continued to 
bolster central power. The persisting 'vertical fiscal imbalance', whereby 
'the states lack independent revenue raising capacity adequate to fully fund 
their expenditure responsibilities, while the Commonwealth has access to 
revenues in excess of its own-purpose expenditure requirements' (Walsh, 
1992: 19; see also Jaensch, 1992: 69ff.), has been especially significant in 
the continuity of federal power. The federal-state power imbalance looks 
set to persist; Keating, the then Prime Minister, largely scotched limited 
plans by fonner Prime Minister Hawke to address the fiscal imbalance 
(Walsh, 1992: 31; Galligan, 1992: 3). Australian federalism continues to be 
largely symbolic (see Lucy, 1993: 293). 
Canadian federalism is far from symbolic. In part, this is a reflection of 
the fact that there are more centrifugal forces working at the core of 
Canadian government than are evident in Australia - provincial 
representation and subsequent log-rolling is a day-to-day reality of federal 
cabinet and budgetary politics (Bakvis and MacDonald, 1993). The 
distinctive issue of Quebec has been a key' factor in curtailing central 
ambitions. Consider the words of Canada's Leader of the Opposition: 
'Every nation has the right to self-government ... We have no quarrel with 
the concept of federalism when applied to uninational states. It is a 
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different matter when it comes to multinational states, particularly the 
Canadian brand of federalism' (Bouchard, 1994). The narrow loss by 
Quebec separatists in the referendum of October 1995 seems unlikely to 
resolve these issues. Further, the Canadian Constitution guarantees powers 
to the provincial governments in the areas of education, health and welfare, 
civil law, natural resources and local government. The financing of 
government at all levels in Canada shows a degree of stability and 
persisting independence for the provinces: 'Both federal and provincial 
governments tax personal and corporate income and also levy general sales 
taxes. Both levels of government can constitutionally tap these sources, 
both now do so, and both are likely to continue to do so' (Bird, 1993: 486). 
Germany is perhaps the most territorially decentralized of all the 
countries under scrutiny. The Lander possess considerable constitutional 
autonomy and a secure source of revenues under national revenue-sharing 
arrangements. The direct representation of the Lander in the federal upper 
house is significant since the Bundesrat 'has absolute veto in matters where 
the competences of the Lander are affected' (Smith, G. 1991: 49), 
However, the role of the Land governments revolves around policy delivery 
and administration, not policy formulation - the latter rests with the 
Chancellor and federal ministers. In practice, even the potential blocking 
powers of the Bundesrat have not proven to be a major constraint on the 
federal government: most legislative proposals do in fact achieve Bundesrat 
approval without major difficulties (Mayntz, 1984: 161). 
Schmidt argues that one of the major political consequences of 
unification has been the accretion of more power at the centre. The new 
Bundesrat has a majority of poorer Lander over richer Lander, is more 
heterogeneous economically, and is dominated by Christian Democrats. 
Among other factors, these developments 'will impede consensus 
formation among the Lander and weaken their position as a whole relative 
to that of the federal government'. This new distribution of power 'widens 
the room to manoeuvre available to federal government' (Schmidt, 1992: 
3), especially when allied with the centralization of economic policy 
brought about by unification. 
In all, it seems reasonable to claim that, with the possible exception of 
Canada, there is no discernible decentralist trend in the five countries. 
Thus, on the face of it, there is little evidence that the state is hollowing out 
in the sense that it is losing or giving up capacities to other levels of 
government. Where central actors have had room for manoeuvre, their 
strat.egy seems to have been to maintain or enhance the power of the centre 
over the periphery. 
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Agencification 
As with the privatization programme, changes in the civil service have been 
most marked in Britain. Under the Next Steps programme, 60 per cent of 
civil servants now work to chief executives in 92 executive agencies, with 
44 more activities identified as agency candidates in December 1993 
(Drewry, 1994). The idea of the Next Steps programme, launched in 1988, 
is 'to create agencies designed to deliver services entirely separated from 
policy-making core departments' (Dowding, 1993: 187-8). While still 
formally under the umbrella of one or other government department - and 
therefore still in a line of ministerial accountability to parliament - pay, 
conditions, and operational matters are dealt with autonomously within 
agencIes. 
The Next Steps reforms, along with further plans to subject top civil 
service jobs to open competition, fragment and render more complex the 
British state. Although there is considerable scope for argument here, there 
is a strong case for saying that they do not amount to a hollowing out of the 
core. These are reforms foisted upon a sometimes reluctant bureaucracy 
from the very top; it is often observed that the reforms would not have been 
as far-reaching and radical without active prime ministerial backing. Other 
things being equal, it enhances the security of ministers not to be held 
directly or fully accountable for bureaucratic shortcomings. They can, in 
principle, gain a new flexibility. freedom to manoeuvre and a capacity to 
concentrate on selected issues, dividing and ruling large swathes of the state 
bureaucracy. 
In the Netherlands, there are current plans to create a series of executive 
agencies in proposals which 'bear a remarkable resemblance to the British 
example' (Kickert, 1994: 3). A key difference is that the responsibility for 
honing and implementing the reforms lies with the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, which has no power to force any other government department to 
reform its structure (Kickert, 1994: 10). Reform is discussed in terms of 
locating the 'core tasks' of government and the separation of policy making 
and policy execution. The paradox, as Kickert points out, is that such 
reforms. which include reducing the number and size of departments, do 
not threaten to leach power away from the core; since separation of policy 
and execution makes policy makers more aware of execution, it 'thus seems 
to lead to the functional integration of policy-making and execution' . 
If anything, recent reforms of the bureaucracy in Canada and Australia 
represent an opposite trend to the one in Britain and that mooted for the 
Netherlands. Reductions in cabinet siie and the creation of new 
amalgamated departments has served in effect to enhance the capacity of 
core' political actors to get what they want in policy terms from the 
bureaucracy. In Germany traditional departmental (and ministerial) 
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independence has persisted. None of these cases arising from the federal 
countries provides strong support for the hollowing out thesis (though as 
elsewhere countervailing trends, such as ministers becoming more involved 
in damage limitation when autonomous agencies get things wrong, are 
evident to varying degrees). 
In sum, the five countries display quite different trends in terms of the 
organization of government departments: fragmentation on the one side, 
rationalization on the other. My contention is that a highly plausible 
interpretation, based on a realistic theory of rule, is that neither is a sign of 
hollowing out, even where ministers have given up day-to-day control of 
bureaucratic agencies. Fragmentation can be a sign of leaders in the core 
executive using their capacities to reshape the state to shield themselves 
from problems arising from operational and sometimes policy failures. 
Style and Substance 
My main contention is that the state is being redefined, or reshaped, not 
hollowed out, at least on this internal dimension. Both theoretical and 
empirical accounts support this preliminary conclusion. Muller and Wright 
(1994) are clear that changes in the instruments of policy making should 
not be misunderstood as shifts in the substance of policy control. Further, 
by pursuing strategies designed to cope with state complexity, core 
executive actors are using the key defining characteristic of the state - its 
monopoly of the legitimate use of coercion (or, more pointedly, their 
legitimate capacity to wield that monopoly) - in a more explicit and 
directed manner than has been evident for some time (though this is true of 
Britain more than the other countries). 
Dunleavy's (1991) comprehensive critique and revision of public 
choice approaches to Western bureaucracies suggests that rational 
bureaucrats will prefer to shape public agencies rather than maximize their 
size or budgets. For a variety of rational reasons, smaller agencies may be 
preferred to larger, more unwieldy ones. For Richardson (1994), less 
government may mean strong government rather than hollowed out 
government. Metaphors borrowed from quite different contexts have a 
certain purchase on these developments; as Western economies have 
shifted broadly from 'Fordist standardized mass production to new 
manufacturing strategies that emphasise productive flexibility' (Hirst, 1994: 
115), so their public sectors have been shaped in a way that might too be 
called 'flexible specialisation'. Clearly, harnessing specialized expertise 
effectively is one of the key advantages of agencification (Majone, 1994: 
84); its 'flexibility' can be said to Increase ministerial discretion to 
intervene in detailed policy matters. 
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These speculations can be underlined by looking briefly at the core 
executives in the states under study. The key questions are: has the core 
executive suffered a gain or a loss in its capacity to set the agenda; to make 
and impose decisions; and/or to coordinate the machinery of government? 
The transformation of British politics and government since 1979 has 
occurred largely due to the force, ideological clarity and persistence of 
Margaret Thatcher as prime minister. She established dominance over the 
cabinet within two years of assuming office, involved herself more in 
departmental policy making than previous prime ministers, shunned 
compromise, and worked effectively through an inner cabinet of trusted 
ministerial and other colleagues both informally (as a kitchen cabinet) and 
formally (through cabinet committees). While substantial reductions in 
government spending eluded her governments, much else that she sought 
by way of wholesale structural and cultural change in government was 
achieved. She realised the potential of a powerful office in a centralized 
polity with few fixed rules of conduct and an undemocratic electoral 
system. Particularly when they operated with her full support, her ministers 
could achieve what in the British context were breathtaking changes in 
health, social services, local government, utilities and other areas. 
In West Germany, the Chancellor has always played a central policy 
role as prescribed in the Basic Law. He is responsible for the 'general 
guidelines' of policy, appoints and dismisses ministers, and ministers' 
primary responsibility is to him and not to the Bundestag (Smith, 1991: 49). 
A key development underpinning the Chancellor's role in recent years has 
been the central role played by the Chancellor's Office. Especially since 
the rapid expansion of its role under Brandt, the Chancellor's Office has 
provided an effective 'reporting system' and contributed to 'an increased 
co-ordinating capacity' (Mayntz, 1980: 165-6). Given the weakness of 
cabinet committees, the Chancellor's Office has gradually become the 
clearing house for cabinet proposals, as well as being the Chancellor's 
general watchdog (Muller-Rommel, 1988: 158). Cabinet in Germany is 
more a rubber stamp than a decision-making body in the full sense of the 
phrase, although ministers can take proposals to full cabinet if they wish 
(Muller-Rommel, 1988: 165-6). There are, of course, constraints on the 
Chancellor's power. Ministerial autonomy and cabinet vetting of 
parliamentary proposals reinforce party and coalition constraints (Mayntz, 
1980: 143-5). But German unification has enhanced the symbolic 
importance of the Chancellorship and seems to have bolstered the degree of 
policy autonomy enjoyed by Chancellor Kohl in the face of major 
economic and social challenges. Not least due to the widespread legitimacy 
of the various powers and constraints evident in the German polity, no real 
hollowing out of the state is evident - if anything the core executive has 
power increasingly concentrated within it. 
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In the Netherlands, the prime minister is in a considerably weaker 
position, but the authority accorded to highly autonomous ministers 
prevents this fact from representing a lack of capacity at the core. 
Andeweg and Irwin write that 
Compared with his British, French, or even German colleagues, the 
Dutch Prime Minister has very few formal powers. He draws up the 
agenda and chairs all meetings of the Cabinet and its committees. He 
casts the deciding vote when there is a tie. But the Prime Minister does 
not appoint ministers and he cannot reshuffle, dismiss or direct them, or 
arbitrate between them without their agreement (Andeweg and Irwin, 
1993: 123-4). 
In general terms, despite high degrees of departmental and ministerial 
autonomy, failed efforts to operate 'inner cabinets' and problems of 
achieving a sufficient degree of interest aggregation in a functionally 
decentralized system, the multi-party nature of Dutch cabinets and the 
difficulties of government formation tend to mean that governments are 
locked into agreed roles and policies. These and other factors may not 
represent an obvious concentration of power in the core executive, but at 
the same time they provide little or no evidence of the state hollowing out. 
Since 1983 in Australia, a clique of ministers, centred on Hawke and/or 
Keating, has achieved major economic reform by gaining effective control 
of core executive institutions, and through them the more distant arms of 
the state. In the earlier years after 1983, the use of cabinet committees, and 
especially the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) (named the 'razor 
gang' after an earlier such committee under the Fraser Government), 
became 'a guillotine for the sacred cows of Labor's ancien regime' (Lucy, 
1993: 154-5). Hawke himself described the ERC as 'the engine room of 
the government'. Further, Hawke made effective use of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet as a source of independent advice and a watch­
dog over other departments' plans and activities. The major structural 
reforms of the cabinet and the bureaucracy in 1987 seem to have further 
consolidated the capacity of key ministers. Devolving decision making to 
larger departments took pressure off the core, streamlining decision 
making, allowing for more effective use of cabinet committees and cabinet 
time (Weller, 1990: 21-2). Aucoin and Bakvis argue that the reforms 
fostered 'crossdepartmentalloyalties to the government's overall corporate 
goals' (Aucoin and Bakvis, 1993: 403). They comment further that: 'The 
succeSli of the Hawke (and later Keating) government in implementing its 
program can be attributed to the greater influence it had over the 
recruitment" and placement of a moderately sized group of departmental 
secretaries and cabinet ministers who collectively had authority over the 
total span of government activities' (Aucoin and Bakvis, 1993: 398). 
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Canadian cabinets experience centrifugal forces much greater than 
those in Australia - 'Much as in the nineteenth century there exists in 
cabinet a set of norms governing the conduct of cabinet business 
concerning the right of ministers to be heard, if not necessarily enjoying a 
right of veto, when matters affecting their provinces come before cabinef 
(Bakvis and MacDonald, 1993: 61). However, the 1980s and the early 
1990s saw a series of reforms, major and minor, which have helped to 
consolidate the capacity of the prime minister and key ministers to pursue 
their aims. The development under Trudeau of the Prime Minister's Office, 
the Priorities and Planning cabinet committees and instruments for effective 
economic control. 'culminated under Mulroney in the hierarchical cabinet'. 
The Operations Committee and the Expenditure Review Committee 
became key tools of core capacity, particularly with regard to spending 
decisions. Under Trudeau and Mulroney there has evidently been an 
increase in prime ministerial capacity to shape the cabinet, its agencies and 
committees, and to select and pursue strategic issues effectively, despite 
provincial politics soaking up much cabinet time outside these strategic 
areas (Bakvis and MacDonald, 1993: 67-8). 
Despite the fact that Canada possesses the most fully developed cabinet 
support system anywhere in terms of key central agencies, the sheer size of 
the cabinet - 39 under Mulroney - rendered it unwieldy (Bakvis and 
MacDonald, 1993: 49). Only extensive use of cabinet committees, 
rendering the cabinet more or less marginal in the decision-making process, 
made this system workable. The reforms of 1993 under Prime Minister 
Campbell reduced the cabinet to 25; cut down the number of cabinet 
committees from 11 to 5; and generally resulted in a more integrated 
structure with a 'reduced number of decision points in the executive 
system' (Aucoin and Bakvis, 1993: 412). Like the Australian reforms 
discussed above, these changes concentrate capacity more effectively 
within the core executive and enhance the capacity of the core executive 
over other parts of the government machine. 
Across the five countries, it is at least plausible to claim that power is 
not leaking away from, or being given away by, the core executive. Latent 
and manifest capacities of prime ministers and key ministers have been 
activated to reorganize and rationalize in the face of structures which 
perhaps provided too many other potential power centres, for example 
within federal bureaucracies. As the predatory theory of rule predicts, core 
executive actors have sought to reduce the degree to which other state and 
non-state actors can constrain them. 
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Rationality and Obfuscation 
I have suggested that, in the face of fragmentation and complexity, it is 
rational for core executive actors to reshape the state so that it better suits 
their own ends. A good deal of what passes for hollowing out can usefully 
be reinterpreted in this light. We must tread carefully around the concept of 
rationality. In the public administration tradition, to structure government 
rationally is to (among other things) maximize clear lines of accountability 
and responsibility .. In other words, to be rational was to seek 'good 
government' - transparent, accountable, efficient and honest. 
In political science today the concept of rationality is rightly and 
invariably seen in a more tough-minded, unsentimental light. To put the 
point bluntly, the core executive of the modem state has a much stronger 
interest in perceptions of good government than in the reality of it. We 
must take fully into account the myriad capacities of the core to foster the 
impression of commonality and even blamelessness for its partisan actions. 
In Habermas's (1974) terms, core executive actors often possess the means 
to prevent a 'rationality crisis' (the state is not doing the good things it says 
it is) from becoming a 'legitimation crisis' (the people perceive the lie and 
lose faith in the state). Comprehensive accounts of information and 
disinformation strategies available to state actors should leave us in. little 
doubt about the extent to which societal perceptions of state success and 
failure can be manipulated by state actors (see, for example, Edelman, 
1977, 1987; Nordlinger. 1981), and why it is rational for them to deploy 
these strategies as much as they can. Core actors can reshape the state 
(especially in unitary, majoritarian systems) and mould perceptions of the 
resulting new order, all to their benefit. 
None of this is to say definitively that no form of hollowing out is 
occurring in some liberal democratic states. It is an argument about how 
trends can look different when viewed through the lens of a more tough­
minded, more strictly explanatory theory. One area in which I happily 
concede substance to the hollowing out thesis is in the state's international 
context (Rhodes rightly discusses the effect of 'the Europeanisation of 
everything'). To show why, I turn now to the third hypothesis. 
External Hollowing Out 
According to Dirks in The Hollow Crown (1987), 'until the emergence of 
British coronia! rule in southern India the crown was not so hollow as it has 
generally been made out to be' (1987: 4), Under colonial rule, the princely 
crown did become hollow, as indigenous poli~cal structures were 'frozen. 
and only the appearances of the old regime - with its vitally connected 
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political and social processes - were saved' (1987: 6). Does the idea of 
hollowing out make most sense if its cause is a layer of political institutions 
above and beyond the machinery of the national state? 
Political scientists are accustomed to viewing national developments in 
isolation. as if forms of interaction between states have little impact on their 
internal dynamics. Burnham (1994: 6) rightly argues that: 'A major task 
for political science in the 1990s is to chart how changes in state form are 
related to intensified globalisation' (see also McGrew, 1'992).11 
Held (1987; 1991) identifies four major 'disjunctures' between 'the 
formal authority of the state and the actual system of production, 
distribution and exchange which in many ways serves to limit the power or 
scope of national political authorities'. Transnational corporations erode 
state autonomy in that their activities are increasingly organized on a global 
scale, a key element in the internationalization of production. Though he is 
of the view that various 'predictions of the death of the nation-state are 
premature', Huntington records views such as Barber's that transnational 
corporations are 'acting and planning in terms that are far in advance of the 
political concepts of the nation-state', and Ball's that while the nation state 
'is still rooted in archaic concepts unsympathetic to the needs of our 
complex world', the transnational corporation 'is a modern concept evolved 
to meet the needs of the modem age' (1994: 224) . 
The role of transnational corporations is closely linked to the 
internationalization of finance. The interpenetration of markets has arisen 
alongside the growth in the number and size of multinationals (MUller and 
Wright, 1994: 5). A major impact on state capacities, structures and 
operations arises from its lack of control over information, especially 
crucial in the realm of finance (MUller and Wright, 1994: 6).12 
National boundaries are no longer so significant as boundaries of 
economic activity. The growth and dynamism of the international economy 
constrains domestic political capacity for economic control and 
manipulation, a development allied with the emergence of sound economic 
management as the primary ingredient of sound political management 
(Sartori, 1991). While these trends are far from uniform across the globe, 
and in places regional organization does afford new forms of national 
government leverage over economic development, they do add up to a 
significant erosion of state autonomy.13 
Second, Held identifies a major disjuncture in the vast array of 
international regimes and organizations that have been established to 
manage whole areas of transnational activity and collective policy 
p.roblems. To varying degrees, and in different policy areas, the World 
Bank and the United Nations, for example, now act as more than just a 
clearing house for multinational decision making, but have developed 
policy autonomy. 
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The third disjunction concerns how the development of international 
law challenges traditional state autonomy. Machinery now exists for the 
collective enforcement of international rights, most notably perhaps under 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Member states of the European Union have 
successfully been prosecuted for violating citizen rights. 
Finally, Held identifies a disjuncture between the idea of the sovereign 
state and the existence of hegemonic powers and regional power blocs. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is arguably becoming an 
even more vital factor after the Cold War than during it, as its tentacles 
reach towards some of the states that were former members of the Warsaw 
Pact. 
According to Parry, we are witnessing an expansive 'interweaving of 
foreign and domestic policy-making' (Parry, 1993). Of course, this is 
clearest for the three countries in this study which are members of the 
European Union, for whom European 'foreign' policy is now effectively 
domestic policy. As Crowe writes: 'There is now hardly an important area 
of national economic life ... which has not been subject to international 
negotiation, legislation or at least co-ordination and co-operation in 
Brussels, often with administration, monitoring or enforcement also from 
Brussels and, even, an international court in Luxembourg' (Crowe, .1993: 
176). Pinder notes that the European Union 'has the powers that a 
federation would require over internal and external trade; and the 
Maastricht treaty gives it federal powers over money' (Pinder. 1992: 419), 
Canada is a part of the NAFTA trading alliance, and Australia's economy 
has been internationalized and linked closely with its ASEAN neighbours. 
In sum, evidence suggests that some national governments are - to put 
the point in its boldest form - becoming local governments (Dahl, 1989), 
In key areas of policy national governments are much more vulnerable than 
ever before to pressures and events beyond their immediate control. 
National economic planning is a task of the state of the past. While caution 
is in order and countervailing trends are evident (Krasner, 1994), the case 
that these globalizing developments represent an external hollowing out of 
core executive capacities remains compelling. 
Hollowing and Reshaping: Combining Internal and 
External Views 
Putting together the two threads of the discussion - the internal reshaping 
and the external erosion of state capacities - suggests that, to varying 
degrees, core executive actors in the states under scrutiny are reshaping the 
state in order to: (a) underscore what remains of their distinctive capacities. 
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(b) foster new forms of selective and flexible policy intervention, and (c) 
ultimately, to reinforce sources and forms of legitimacy. On the one hand, 
this is to emphasize the point that core executive actors must be understood 
as rational actors operating within various structural constraints. On the 
other, it is to underscore the dynamic nature of links between internal and 
external factors. Core executive actors today find themselves caught in a 
maelstrom of pressures, to which they have responded by attempting to 
redefine and clarify their powers just as those powers are in many respects 
leaching away to higher authorities and processes. 
At the centre of this maelstrom are the capacities of core executive 
actors to adapt to the demands of a rapidly changing external environment. 
Political scientists whose primary concern is international relations have 
been prime movers in developing frameworks to analyze adaptive 
strategies. Rosenau (1989) argues that 
an inverse relationship between internal controls and external 
vulnerabilities appears to have emerged as a prime parameter within 
which the modem state must function. And since the trend line for the 
future seems likely to involve an ever growing vulnerability to global 
events and processes, the controls exercised by the state at home appear 
destined to undergo a corresponding expansion (1989: 35). 
To get to the heart of the matter, he says, we must view the state 'as an 
adaptive entity and its activities as a politics of adaptation' (1989: 37). 
Of the four types of adaptive strategy available to states (acquiescent, 
promotive, intransigent and preservative), Rosenau suggests that 
'preservative adaptation' - the effort to achieve equilibrium in the face of 
extensive internal and external pressures for change - is and will 
increasingly prove to be the global norm (1989: 42). Something of the 
terms of this equilibrium may be gleaned from Hirst and Thompson's 
(1995: 423-35) observations that national states still have crucial roles to 
play in an internationalized economy where 'governance' is becoming 
more important than 'government'. They cite. for example, the continuing 
pivotal role for national states as providers of coherence in links between 
sub-national and supra-national entities, of stability for financial markets, 
and more generally of the rule of law. 
While dense patterns of interdependence make national states 
increasingly vulnerable, they bring them both new constraints and new 
opportunities (Parry, 1993: 145). Campanella argues that rational 
purposive state actors face an increasing need for 'proactive policies', 
which go beyond mere domestic adaptation: 'unlike adjustment or reactive 
policies, proactive policy-making aims not to adapt but to find a 
comprehensive response to a crisis' (Campanella, 1991: 497). Proactive 
policy making, in her view, means opening up the domestic economy to 
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international competitive pressures and forging alliances - often regional 
alliances such as the European Union and NAFfA. 'They are proactive 
because they are major policies made through cooperative, intra­
governmental decision-making' (Campanella, 1991: 497). 
Proactive policy making is used in efforts to achieve favourable 
economic conditions that can no longer be manipulated successfully on the 
domestic front alone. In this sense, the increasing regional involvement of 
each of the five countries can be viewed as a rational strategy in the face of 
limited capacity and powerful economic imperatives. But this time the 
strategy can plausibly be viewed as arising from the vulnerability of core 
executive actors due to the hollowing out of their position from 'above'. 
The pursuit of proactive policies in this sense requires national state 
machinery capable of flexibility, decisiveness and perhaps above all of 
leadership. Arguably at least, it is the core executive in each of these 
national states which must play this role. Australian opening out to the 
world economy has been a product of the Hawke-Keating axis at the heart 
of the revitalized core executive (Kelly, 1994). Andeweg and Irwin suggest 
that membership of the European Union may have increased the policy 
autonomy of Dutch prime ministers despite the considerable domestic 
constraints which bound the occupants of the office: 'European integration 
does not necessarily weaken national executives. In the Dutch case at least, 
"Brussels" may have strengthened the decision-making capability of the 
national political system' (Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 238). 
No longer the foci of relatively independent economic policy making. 
core executive actors have come to playa mediating role between external 
forces and internal capacities to benefit from those forces. At the same 
time, these rational actors look to their own legitimacy, carving out for 
themselves a more subtle and flexible domestic role - exemplified by 
agencification, privatization and the 'rise of the regulatory state' - that 
allows them (in many though not all instances) to enhance domestic control 
over the remaining. and newly revised, levers of national policy making. 
Domestically, the evidence points to a conscious reshaping of the state 
rather than intended or unintended hollowing out. However, this reshaping 
can be seen to a significant degree as a response to a real hollowing out of 
core executive capacities in the face of globalizing trends. 
Conclusion: Whither the Hollow Crown? 
My tentative conclusion is that the evidence points to a hollowing out of 
core executive capacity due to globalization even while core executives 
actively seek to shore up their own internal power. I put this forward as a 
hypothesis with considerable empirical support, though countervailing 
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trends are evident in a number of countries. Other chapters offer more 
detailed and analytically localized arguments which variously support and 
reject this line of thinking. My second main contention has been 
methodological: it is more fruitful to explore the hollowing out hypothesis 
by regarding core executive actors as rational maximizers of their own 
power. They may say otherwise, but we must watch as well as listen. 
Notes 
1 . 	 Each of these approaches may well tell us something important about the state, 
but they are secondary characteristics or simplifying devices which are 
parasitic on the primary definition. 
2. 	 At least. not above baseline provision of law and order. This baseline is 
consistent with the view that above minimally essential provisions these 
security values are never evenly distributed. On the idea of the principled state 
more generally within democratic theory, see Zolo's (1992) critique of 
Schumpeter (1976). 
3. 	 Even recent Marxist theories of the state fit this characterization. Marxists 
have largely abandoned the search for a theory of the state (see Jessop, 1982). 
Some have relied more on dramatic assertion than empirical demonstration 
(e.g. Althusser, 1971). Poulantzas (1980) wrote of various di vided fractions of 
capital colonizing parts of an equally fragmented state structure, with working 
class and other non-capitalist interests themselves represented within the state. 
He wrote too of the 'relative autonomy' of the modern state. Criticism of 
'bourgeois' pluralists strains credulity in the face of such apparent 
abandonment of the overarching explanatory capacity of the Marxist 
framework. 
4. 	 Dunleavy and Rhodes have defined the core executive as 'all those 
organisations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and 
integrate central government policies. or act as final arbiters within the 
executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine' 
(Dunleavy and Rhodes. 1990: 4). However, this definition assumes what needs 
to be demonstrated - that the core executive does what the textbooks say it 
should be doing. It is probably more helpful simply to define the core 
executive in institutional terms, and leave the flows of power to further 
investigation. 
5. 	 This approach is standard in historical studies of the state. See, for example, 
North (1986) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992). 
6. 	 The term privatization can refer to such different things as the outright sale of 
public sector companies, the encouragement of private sector involvement in 
public companies and public projects, the introduction of private sector 
management and operational norms to public enterprises, and so on (see 
Vickers and Wright, 1988: 3). I shall use the term here to refer to the selling 
off of public companies to the private sector. 
7. 	 In the Netherlands, a number of smaller public companies and a 23 per cent 
share in KLM were also sold off (Vickers and Wright, 1988: 23). 
8. 	 The persistence of the corporatist tradition in the Netherlands has played its 
role. It is reflected in the continuing fragmented and complex network of 
36 In Search ofthe Hollow Crown 
advisory and other bodies in Dutch government, but also in the moderate 
approach to industrial privatization (see Andeweg and Irwin, 1993: 170-3). 
9. As a general point, the effects of privatization, even in countries where it has 
been pursued successfully and extensively, should not obscure the reach of the 
state into the national economy. As Vickers and Wright remind us, 'The State, 
everywhere in Western Europe, continues massively to intervene in the 
economy by regulating the terms and influencing the environment of public 
and private industry operations in a number of ways' (see for further detail 
Vickers and Wright, 1988: 26-7). 
10. Arguably 'regulation' should be treated separately from privatization, 
agencification, etc., though as a modem development in the structure and 
functions of the state it is closely linked with these other trends. Majone 
(1994: 80) writes that: '. . . neither American deregulations nor European 
privatizations can be interpreted as a retreat of the state, but rather as a 
redefinition of its functions. What is observed in practice is a redrawing of the 
borders of the public sphere in a way that excludes certain fields better left to 
private activity, while at the same time strengthening and ever expanding the 
state's regulatory capacity in other fields like competition or environmental or 
consumer protection'. It is worth noting that, in Britain at least, regulation for 
consumer protection (broadly conceived) serves as a direct substitute for public 
ownership (in the cases of gas, electricity and water). Further, regulation may 
not restrict ministerial influence. For example, the proposed new 
Environmental Agency in Britain, although nominally independent of the 
responsible minister, is being set up under legislation that would allow detailed 
direction in the area of standard setting by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment. 
II. See Redner (1990) for an extensive effort to generate concepts which might 
perform this function. 
12. Keohane and Nye (1994: 232) comment generally that 'integration of money 
markets internationally, in the context of governmental responsibility for 
national economies, has made government policy sensitive both to changes in 
interest rates by other governments and central banks, and to movements of 
funds by nongovernmental speculators. These sensitivities are heightened 
further by the expanding decision domains of transnational organisations such 
as multinational business firms and banks, reinforced by decreases in the cost 
of transnational communications' (see also Hirst, 1994: 112ff.). 
13. According to Jessop (1994), 'two key transformations in advanced capitalist 
state during the current global economic restructuring which bear directly on 
the nature of economic and social policy regimes' are 'a tendential shift from a 
Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare state; and a tendential 
"hollowing out" of the national state'. 
